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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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19 November 1963

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 November 1963

### DAILY BRIEF

\*Iraq: The army appears to be in firm control of the country but the political complexion of the new regime is still not clear.

President Arif was evidently able to achieve united army action against the former government by playing on almost universal army disgust with the role of the national guard--the paramilitary organ of the Baath Party--in the events of the past week. Radio announcements stress that the army acted against the national guard but make no mention of the Baath Party itself.

Arif--a non-Baathist "Arab nationalist" with former ties to Cairo--has himself assumed most of the executive power of the state. The military governor general, also a non-Baathist, remains at his post and has taken over the Interior Ministry. Arif has issued appeals of friendship to both Egypt and Syria, and Baghdad radio has broadcast songs praising Nasir. A period of eased relations with Cairo is likely to ensue; Egyptian spokesmen have already welcomed the coup.

However, the new regime still retains some Baathist coloration. There appear to have been no changes in command in the army, and Baathist officers continue to hold positions of considerable importance in the military. The new regime's second

in command is General Hardan Tikriti, a Baathist of long standing who played a major part in last February's coup. The new director general of police is a Baathist. Former Foreign Minister Shabib, leader of the moderate faction now in exile in Beirut, has warmly praised the army action.

It is not certain, however, if all these elements consider themselves bound by the decisions of the Baath Party international command, which is now apparently under arrest in Baghdad. Damascus radio has broadcast a series of strong attacks on the new regime in the name of the Baath, but these attacks ceased abruptly on the evening of 18 November. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Communist China - USSR: The fifth commentary in Peiping's current series attacking Soviet policies indicates that the Chinese are dismissing Khrushchev's public request for a pause in the polemics as a tactical move to gain him a temporary respite.

The long 19 November article heaps heavy personal abuse on Khrushchev. It suggests that the Chinese feel, as they did last February when Khrushchev also called for a cessation of polemics, that this is a good time to press the attack. They probably believe that the apparent coolness of other Communist parties toward a Soviet desire for an international Communist meeting that would condemn the Chinese reflects a weakness in the Soviet position.

The comment that the US has not become a beautiful angel "in spite of Khrushchev's bible-reading and psalm-singing" conveys the flavor of the article.

The sensitivity of the Chinese to Khrushchev's accusations that they are warmongers is again reflected in their attempts to portray themselves as peaceful. They note, for example, that they entered the Korean War merely to keep the US and the Soviet Union from a direct confrontation with nuclear weapons.

The Chinese led up to the current article with a charge on 15 November that more than 80 articles with anti-Chinese commentary appeared in the Soviet

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press in one two-week period following Khrushchev's 25 October request for cessation of polemics. The harsh tone of the present article may be designed to draw a Soviet response which would show that the USSR really has no interest in suing for peace.

Moscow has now begun to hint that, instead of an international meeting, another bilateral meeting might be held. Moscow probably believes that the almost inevitable failure of bilateral talks would show that its constant attempts to be reasonable produce no change in Chinese behavior.

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British Guiana: (The governing party and opposition elements are showing increased strains under the impact of preparing for a new election.)

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(Efforts to form a new East Indian party to capitalize on anti-Jagan sentiment seem to be at least temporarily stymied. B. S. Rai, an East Indian expelled from the PPP last year, talked earlier of forming such a party, but recently indicated he would prefer to do nothing or to join the small, conservative United Force (UF). Present UF prospects for attracting additional East Indian support are dim.)

(Opposition leader Forbes Burnham, in his characterization of Jagan as a vacillating betrayer of socialism, drew a good response from a large crowd on 13 November. He was unable, however, to arouse much enthusiasm about the record of his own People's National Congress. The PNC also is showing signs of dissension--two conservative legislators reportedly would like to quit.)

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
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\*Italy: (Prime Minister-designate Aldo Moro believes that rightist elements opposed to a center-left government are attempting to intimidate him by a military show of force.)


(He suspects that this was the motive behind a planned large-scale exercise by 10,000 military policemen that was to have been held in the Rome area on 16 November. The exercise was called off at Moro's insistence, but the troopers are standing by for a rescheduling of the operation.)

(The precise connection, if any, between this incident and other pressures to prevent Moro from establishing a center-left government is not yet clear. The psychological climate in Rome, however, is such that political tension is bound to increase.)

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NOTES

Cuba-USSR: A Soviet SO-1-class subchaser under tow by an oceangoing Soviet tug apparently is en route to Havana. The SO-1 is a newer and smaller version of the Kronshtadt-class subchaser, six of which were delivered to Cuba last year. [Several more subchasers are reportedly scheduled for delivery to Cuba in the next two months.]  
(Photo) [REDACTED]

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Turkey: Preliminary unofficial returns from the nationwide local and provincial elections held on 17 November show the opposition Justice Party running well ahead of Prime Minister Inonu's Republican Peoples' Party. An overwhelming vote for the Justice Party--the heir of the old Menderes regime--would increase restiveness among the Turkish military. Ankara martial-law authorities have issued a formal warning against any type of demonstration growing out of the elections. [REDACTED]

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